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LETTER FROM PORT MORESBY
John D. Moore
As the world shifts away from the global 
war on terrorism toward renewed great-
power rivalry, areas previously considered 
strategically peripheral offer the United 
States and its allies both opportunity and 
challenge. Papua New Guinea (PNG), 
with its strategic location in the southwest 
Pacific, is poised to play a role in this new 
“Great Game.” American engagement with 
PNG and other Pacific Island nations that 
focuses on collaboration with regional al-
lies and that smartly applies U.S. political, 
financial, and military power will be a key 
factor in the outcome. At the same time, 
understanding the broader regional set of 
interests of allies and opponents alike will better inform policy making and im-
prove the potential for positive policy outcomes.
A COMPLEX PLACE
Although it achieved its independence in 1975, PNG still is beset by multiple 
development challenges, akin to those experienced elsewhere in the Pacific and 
parts of Africa. Yet, as seen in the national intro-
spection displayed at the February 2021 passing 
of PNG founding father and first prime minister 
Sir Michael Thomas Somare, the country con-
tinues to show the potential to move beyond its 
current challenges.1 To those fortunate enough 
to have lived and worked in PNG, it is at once a 
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breathtakingly beautiful and a frustratingly complex place to engage. With over 
850 languages, thousands of clan and subclan groups, an overlay of Christianity 
on local belief systems, and over 70 percent of its population living in rural—
often highly rugged—areas, the complicated nature of the country cannot be 
overstated.2 PNG occupies the eastern half of the western Pacific island of New 
Guinea, together with the key islands of New Britain, New Ireland, and the Au-
tonomous Region of Bougainville, along with some six hundred lesser islands 
and atolls.3 PNG, with an estimated population of eight million, is the largest and 
most populated of the countries composing the Pacific Island area. In addition 
to its human complexities, PNG has an incredible diversity of geographic and 
natural resources.
Sharing a long land border with Indonesian Papua, PNG is a young, modern 
nation-state, but one that reflects and holds onto a much longer history.4 The tri-
als of traditional society coming to grips with modernity have shaped PNG for 
decades and also will influence the way it engages, and is engaged by, the evolv-
ing rivalry between the United States and its allies and a strengthening China 
and those countries within its orbit. There is limited government penetration 
across the country, and many of the present development challenges are likely 
to continue for the foreseeable future. Limited institutional capacity, lack of a 
governmental monopoly on violence, a limited formal economy, and the need 
for a political leadership that can articulate, garner support for, and implement 
public policies that represent a shared sense of national interest are but some of 
the issues that PNG faces. It is essential to understand these challenges, as they 
shape directly the way in which the growing competition to establish favorable 
regional relations is unfolding.
A STRATEGIC POSITION
PNG’s previous colonial power, Australia, which managed it after World War I, 
has a deep and enduring relationship with its northern neighbor. PNG remains 
Australia’s largest recipient of foreign aid, and strong ties continue between the 
Australian Defence Force and the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF). PNG domi-
nates the northern approaches to Australia; that, added to historical tension 
with Indonesia and increasing Chinese involvement in PNG and the region, 
explains why Australia’s interest in maintaining a leading role in PNG is likely 
to continue.
While Australia plays an outsize role in PNG, multiple other countries also 
have substantial ties to the country. Japan long has been an aid donor to PNG 
and maintains strong diplomatic ties, and New Zealand similarly is a leading 
donor. Ties between PNG and other Melanesian countries, such as Fiji, continue 
to strengthen and grow. At the same time, Chinese diplomatic and economic 
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investment in PNG has increased, including involvement in a mix of infrastruc-
ture projects (including energy, roads, and airports) on mainland PNG, as well 
as the islands of Manus and Bougainville. Similarly to the pattern seen in other 
countries, PNG’s leaders seek to benefit from multiple points of investment in the 
country without compromising its sovereignty.
While memory of the combat that engulfed the then territory of New Guinea 
remains a key part of Australian and PNG military lore, most Americans long 
have forgotten their country’s involvement in the campaign, much less New 
Guinea’s strategic role in supporting the American advance through the Pacif-
ic.5 Some seven thousand American soldiers and airmen were killed during the 
New Guinea campaign, with missing-in-action records indicating that hundreds 
more were lost in the jungles and seas across mainland PNG and its surrounding 
islands.6
Since the 2018 U.S. commitment to join Australia’s effort to upgrade the 
PNGDF’s Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island, many elites in Port Moresby 
view the country as having reemerged onto the U.S. radar. Others may recall 
Manus Island as playing a part in the much-debated Australian asylum-seeker 
policy. One of PNG’s twenty-two provinces, the island sits north of the PNG 
mainland and is positioned along critical air and naval lines of communication 
linked to U.S. outposts in the Marianas and elsewhere in the Pacific.7 Its posi-
tion enables naval and air assets based on the island to influence the area along 
Source: Shugart, “A Chinese-Built Airport?”
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Australia’s eastern seaboard south to New Zealand, as well as the approaches to 
maritime East Asia.8
Manus, as well as other locations in PNG, complements efforts by the United 
States, Australia, Japan, and their allies to expand and enhance maritime- 
surveillance networks to monitor vessel traffic and conduct early warning, while 
assisting the PNGDF to increase its basic maritime-reconnaissance and patrol 
capabilities. While the country is unable to house major USN surface combatants 
without significant and sustained investment, pre-positioning of fuel and other 
stocks in PNG can assist vessels operating in the region. Meanwhile, advances 
in aerial, surface, and subsurface unmanned capabilities hold the potential for 
the establishment of a network of interlocking microbases across the Pacific, in 
which Manus could play an important role. In addition to Manus Island, loca-
tions elsewhere along PNG’s northern and eastern areas may offer the potential 
for both fuel pre-positioning and the basing of intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance assets in the future. Engagement also can span other areas of mu-
tual interest, including research into tropical diseases, countering illegal fishing, 
monitoring changes in coastal as well as blue-water environmental conditions, 
and maritime emergency response.
RELATIONSHIPS ARE WHAT MATTER
While PNG offers opportunities to support U.S. and coalition naval operations, 
stronger diplomatic and military relations with PNG and other Pacific island na-
tions are likely to prove even more critical than the physical basing of supplies or 
naval assets. Lessons from the Cold War, as well as post–Cold War engagement 
in the Middle East and South Asia, repeatedly have demonstrated that relying 
on merely transactional approaches rather than longer-term relation-building 
efforts—whether conducted in bilateral or multilateral settings—limits the 
potential for lasting positive outcomes. Other lessons underscore the dangers 
of mission creep and overreach, along with the problematic impacts that occur 
when tactics are mistaken for strategy.
The U.S.-Australia relationship is a cornerstone of American policy in this 
part of the Pacific, but Australia has limitations in its ability to manage regional 
engagement across the strategic-operational-tactical continuum. Given Austra-
lia’s historical connections to PNG, along with PNG’s proximity as Australia’s 
nearest neighbor, successive governments in Canberra have pushed to be the 
lead partner for PNG and the medium through which Washington should engage 
with Port Moresby. Over the decades, Australia regularly has advised the United 
States and other allies to “leave PNG to us.”9
However, the rising competition with China has seen the Australian position 
moderate in recent years, as Canberra aims to collaborate with Washington and 
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others to counter Beijing’s growing political and economic investment in PNG. 
The need for the United States to bolster, and on occasion strategically to re-
align, allied engagement in the region is reflected in recent divisions within the 
Pacific Islands Forum and subsequent concerns that China may take advantage 
of such rifts, should Australia prove unable to resolve them effectively.10 In turn, 
while Australia welcomes further U.S. engagement in the region, Canberra has 
valid concerns over any U.S. engagement that might smack of the clumsiness 
Washington has shown in other regions. Genuine partnership and a willingness 
by Canberra and Washington both to lead and to follow, depending on shifting 
situational dynamics, are needed.
Capitalizing on joint efforts in the development space as a platform for 
increased military cooperation is not just smart but essential. The Australian 
Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP) is one such framework, 
with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States working with the PNG 
government to support the country’s target of providing 70 percent of the popula-
tion access to reliable electricity by 2030 under the AIFFP’s Papua New Guinea 
Electrification Partnership.11
Chinese involvement in Bougainville is an ongoing concern for Australia and 
the United States, as are Chinese efforts to establish a fish-processing facility on 
Daru Island, which is located only a few kilometers from Australia’s northern 
border and some two hundred kilometers from its mainland.12 Chinese engage-
ment in PNG has seen several Chinese parastatal and Chinese Communist 
Party–linked private-sector companies build ties to local politicos and busi-
nesses. As part of its regional initiative, China has become an increasingly im-
portant source of loans and other financial support to the PNG economy, and 
Beijing remains an important export market for PNG’s natural resources.13 A 
Chinese-government Guide for Foreign Investment and Cooperation, published 
in January 2019, gives insight into Beijing’s intent. The document character-
izes PNG as a supporter of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with the closing 
paragraph stating, “The Chinese government calls on more powerful Chinese 
companies, inspired by the Belt and Road Initiative, to carry out reciprocal trade 
and invest in PNG.”14
While the discussion of so-called debt trap diplomacy has ebbed and flowed, 
of likely greater importance than a specific debt percentage of gross domestic 
product owed to Beijing is the way Chinese loans (or other state-to-state en-
gagements) are structured and governed. By allowing local elites access to these 
rent streams, China builds local leverage. Such leverage may not prove lasting, 
however; there are few obvious sociocultural ties between the PNG and Chinese 
peoples, and thus the extent to which Beijing can use transactional relationships 
to exert more-overt control over PNG’s external orientation remains to be seen.
5
Moore: Letter from Port Moresby
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 1 3 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
The Manus example is informative. At the same time as the joint Australian-
U.S. effort at Lombrum is under way, Manus Island Momote Airport, financed 
primarily by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), is being upgraded by China 
Harbour Engineering Company, a subsidiary of China Communications Con-
struction Company (CCCC).15 Worthy of note is that CCCC reportedly is sup-
porting the construction of China’s artificial island bases in the South China Sea, 
so Washington has targeted it for potential sanctions.16 According to politically 
astute Manus Islanders, the current governor is “pushing above his weight” and 
does not necessarily have broad support, even as he attempts to use Chinese eco-
nomic involvement to advance his own narrow interests.17
While local political leaders may seek to use the rivalry with China to their 
personal advantage, there remains a reservoir of positive sentiment toward the 
United States. The historical memory of the American role in Manus and else-
where in the vicinity during World War II is key to this, with the generation of 
elders who lived during that period passing on stories to successive generations. 
Yet geostrategic interests need both to respect and to value local pragmatism 
about the people’s socioeconomic aspirations.
ENGAGEMENT FORWARD
In looking toward fostering a new era of U.S.-PNG relations, it is critical that the 
United States keep its eyes wide open regarding the country’s reality. Local poli-
tics increasingly has become a means for elites to capture wealth, with the views 
and actions of elected leaders not necessarily representing the actual interests of 
the communities with which the United States may engage. Australia’s engage-
ments in PNG and Oceania offer insights into how the United States best can 
build and sustain long-term political-military relationships in support of Ameri-
can interests. USN port visits and humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief 
operations, along with public-relations efforts, will continue to prove important. 
Participation alongside the Royal Australian Navy in training exercises with PNG 
counterparts, combined with U.S. provision or funding of equipment and logisti-
cal support for PNGDF littoral operations, also provides opportunities for naval 
forces to engage with PNG and to shape U.S.-PNG relations positively.
Beyond these traditional forms of engagement, an increased tempo of visits from 
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command personnel, combined with efforts by the U.S. State 
Department and other government agencies to strengthen diplomatic and eco-
nomic relations, at the same time as the United States builds further collaboration 
with Australia and other allies in the region, is critical. The eventual opening of the 
new U.S. embassy building in Port Moresby will be an important milestone in the 
growing American commitment to PNG, with embassy reach strengthened by the 
integration of a defense attaché office within the diplomatic mission.18 Additional 
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interagency involvement that draws on the principles espoused in the Global Fra-
gility Strategy would bolster efforts to strengthen U.S.-PNG relations further.19
While collaboration with Canberra and other regional capitals is essential, 
it also is important for Washington to foster a distinctly U.S. relationship with 
the PNG state and its diverse people. In PNG there is a rare spirit of openness 
and friendship toward the United States that often is absent in other parts of the 
world. Yet that sense of goodwill is insufficient absent U.S. political and econom-
ic, as well as military, investment. With China able to use strategic investments 
to peel away layers of elite support, engagement in PNG and elsewhere is not 
cost-free, yet the transactional nature of China’s engagement to date offers the 
United States the opportunity to strengthen ties with both PNG’s government 
and its society.
China’s rise does not necessarily imply that future conflict is destined. Howev-
er, where a vacuum of U.S. and allied engagement and investment exists, Beijing 
will be poised to fill such space. As the strategic landscape continues to evolve, 
ensuring a permissive peacetime environment for maritime operations while 
strengthening political and military relationships well prior to any potential 
war-fighting scenario is fundamental. The United States must work with other 
nations, not alone nor solely with existing regional allies. America must act with 
humility and listen to those with more insight regarding regional, country, and 
subcountry dynamics.
From the perspective of those in the region, Washington should pursue a mul-
tidimensional approach that understands and appreciates differences between 
“like-situated countries” that are more concerned about risks arising from great-
power rivalries and those countries that are like-minded and willing to oppose 
the weakening of a liberal, rules-based order. Countries across the region have 
different interests and drivers and have different, and occasionally competing, 
foreign-policy priorities, as well as different capacities to counter Chinese pres-
sure.20 Efforts to move beyond the transactional aspects of state-to-state relations 
to relations based increasingly on shared values ultimately will prove more lasting 
and more supportive of American interests.
N O T E S
 1. Somare was a prominent PNG political 
leader. Often called the father of the nation, 
he was a teacher and radio journalist before 
his 1968 election to the territorial House of 
Assembly. Appointed chief minister of the 
territory in 1973, he became the country’s 
first prime minister upon independence in 
1975, and served again as prime minister 
on two other occasions. His formal political 
career ended in 2012.
 2. The main religion in PNG is Christianity, 
although, like elsewhere, pre-Christian belief 
systems continue to shape the interpretation 
and practice of religion. For a more detailed 
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overview of Christian denominations and 
religious minorities present, see U.S. State 
Dept., “Papua New Guinea,” in 2019 Report 
on International Religious Freedom (Wash-
ington, DC: Office of International Religious 
Freedom, 2019), available at www.state.gov/.
 3. The other half of the island is part of Indo-
nesia, with West Papuan independence and 
associated claims of Indonesian human-rights 
abuses an ongoing issue. PNG is divided 
into four regions, with a total of twenty-two 
provinces across the different regions, as 
follows: Highlands Region—Hela, Jiwaka, 
Chimbu, Eastern Highlands, Enga, Southern 
Highlands, and Western Highlands; Islands 
Region—East New Britain, Manus, New 
Ireland, Autonomous Region of Bougainville, 
and West New Britain; Momase Region—East 
Sepik, Madang, Morobe, and West Sepik 
(Sandaun); Southern Region—Central, Gulf, 
Milne Bay, Oro, Western, and the National 
Capital District.
 4. PNG’s settled history is thousands of years 
old, with European (British, Dutch, German) 
engagement increasing in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.
 5. It was over the PNG island of Bougainville 
that U.S. airmen intercepted and shot down 
a Japanese bomber carrying the architect of 
Japan’s Pearl Harbor attack, Adm. Isoroku 
Yamamoto, in Operation VENGEANCE. For 
details of U.S. soldiers and airmen repatriated 
from PNG, search the Defense POW/MIA 
Accounting Agency (DPAA) records available 
at www.dpaa.mil/.
 6. “Pentagon Enlisting Outsiders to Help Search 
for US WWII MIAs,” Chicago Tribune, 19 
September 2015, www.chicagotribune.com/.
 7. See Thomas Shugart, “A Chinese-Built Air-
port Next Door to a Key Australia-US Naval 
Base?,” The Interpreter, 7 August 2020, www 
.lowyinstitute.org/. Manus Island is the largest 
island in what is known as the Admiralty 
Islands.
 8. See Ben Wan Beng Ho, “The Strategic Sig-
nificance of Manus Island for the U.S. Navy,” 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 144/12/1,390 
(December 2018), available at www.usni.org/.
 9. Jonathan Pryke, “The Curious Case of Aid 
Concentration in Papua New Guinea,” The 
Interpreter, 14 February 2019, www.lowy 
institute.org/.
 10. Tess Newton Cain, “With Five Countries Set 
to Quit, Is It Curtains for the Pacific Islands 
Forum?,” The Conversation, 15 February 
2021, theconversation.com/.
 11. Current connectivity is 13 percent. For addi-
tional detail on the AIFFP, see AIFFP, “Papua 
New Guinea Electrification Partnership,” 
media release, 30 June 2020, www.aiffp.gov 
.au/.
 12. For a more detailed look at Chinese involve-
ment in Bougainville, see Rowan Callick, 
“Real Cost of Independence: The Referendum 
in Bougainville Brings Risks and Opportuni-
ties for Australia and China,” The Australian, 
8 December 2019, www.theaustralian.com 
.au/. Bougainville often is seen as a potential 
bellwether; should it achieve independence, 
other provinces in PNG also may seek to se-
cede. Like Bougainville, East New Britain and 
New Ireland have a closer cultural affinity 
to the Solomons than to Papua New Guinea, 
while Enga in the western highlands always 
has had a physical and political remoteness 
from Port Moresby.
 13. In 2018, data from Australia’s Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade showed China as 
the third-largest recipient of PNG exports, 
behind Australia and Singapore, with Japan 
in fourth place. See Australian Government, 
Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Papua 
New Guinea—Papua New Guinea’s Global 
Merchandise Trade Relationships,” fact sheet, 
dfat.gov.au/.
 14. Graeme Smith, China’s Guide to Investment 
Cooperation in Papua New Guinea, In Brief 
2019/25 (Canberra, ACT: Australian National 
Univ., n.d.), available at dpa.bellschool.anu 
.edu.au/.
 15. The ADB’s two largest funders since its incep-
tion are Japan and the United States. The 
People’s Republic of China is the third-largest 
contributor to the ADB, with Australia the 
fourth.
 16. Shugart, “A Chinese-Built Airport?”
 17. Bill Bainbridge and Jack Kilbride, “Lombrum 
Naval Base: Manus Governor Slams Australia 
over Plans to Develop Joint Naval Base,” ABC 
News [Australia], 20 November 2018, www 
.abc.net.au/.
 18. The new U.S. embassy will serve Papua New 
Guinea, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands.
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 19. For details on the Global Fragility Strategy, 
see U.S. State Dept., 2020 United States Strat-
egy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 
(Washington, DC: 2020), available at www 
.state.gov/.
 20. Kuyoun Chung, “Why South Korea Is Balking 
at the Quad,” East Asia Forum, 31 March 
2021, www.eastasiaforum.org/.
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